THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM: THE
PROCESS OF REFORM
JOHN C. WEISTART*

There is an appearance of great ferment in discussions of the American law school and its curriculum. Proposals for reform abound. Some
of these criticize the general structure-or lack of structure-in the
traditional curriculum. Others suggest that the law school curriculum is
deficient for its failure to provide instruction in a particular subject matter or skill. Economics, other social sciences, lawyering, mediation, and
other litigation avoidance devices are among the new perspectives frequently urged.
Only a few of the proposals put forth to date are merely fanciful.
Most can be justified either by a desire to foster a better understanding of
the legal system or to contribute to its better functioning. In a legal education world of no restraints, there would be little reason to reject the
proposals being put forth.
Curriculum planning, however, takes place in a world of restraints
and costs. Despite the obviousness of this point, it has received little
attention in the present discussion. Indeed, there has been a surprisingly
limited effort to assess the present climate for reform. It is not uncommon for a new idea to be put forth and pronounced "better" with virtually no serious attention being given to the factors that define its likely
reception.
When explanations are attempted for why a particular new idea has
not been embraced, common, somewhat conclusory themes emerge. Not
infrequently, these take the form of pejorative appraisals of the impact of
the considerable autonomy that individual faculty members enjoy. Faculties are seen as tradition-bound and unreceptive to new ideas.
There is, though, a good deal more that needs to be said about the
process of curriculum change in law schools. Complaints of traditionalism and excessive claims of prerogative by faculty provide very imperfect, if not incorrect, explanations. A variety of concerns need to be
examined in order to provide a more complete picture of the process that
will determine the outcome of the present debate.
* Professor of Law, Duke University. Theresa A. Newman Glover provided superior assistance in the background research for this piece, an effort which became something of "A Walking
Tour of Famous Graveyards."
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Among the factors to be appraised are the structural features of the
present curriculum that have recently permitted law schools to respond
to a variety of new developments in perceptions about the law and the
role of lawyers. The modem curriculum may in fact have changed more
than it is typically given credit for. To the extent that it has a capacity
for absorption and accommodation, there is not likely to be a warm reception for proposals that assume a radical redirection focused on a single theme.
Also warranting attention is the issue of the cost of various reforms.
The traditional structure of legal education, particularly its emphasis on
large group instruction in basic courses, has an economic appeal that will
almost certainly be persistent. Proposals that assume costly methods of
instruction are likely to encounter resistance. Those that continue the
balance between large group and closely supervised instruction will be
preferred. Ultimately, though, the greatest concern may be for the loss
of flexibility, and hence creativity, that would attend a heavily regulated
curriculum. These values may turn out to be more important than the
symmetry that would be achieved in a carefully crafted program of instruction. The following discussion considers the impact of these issues
on the present curriculum debate.
I.

THE REFORM AGENDA

A. Earlier Trends.
In developing a perspective on curriculum reform, it is useful to
consider both the proposals that have been debated and settled and the
newer suggestions that await scrutiny. As to the former, there are indeed
a number of lessons from the past that should be useful in gauging the
reception likely to be given to new ideas. 1 The past fifteen years has been
a particularly active period for curriculum committees. And if the time
period for inquiry is stretched a bit further, additional proposals can be
included. Views will surely differ as to how the proposals of the past
should be characterized and which are most important. From my perspective, Murray Schwartz is correct in identifying the following devel1. For writings that provide a broader historical perspective on the development of legal education, see A. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1953); R. STEVENS, LAW
SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s; (1983); Currie, The
Materials of Law Study, Part One, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 331 (1951); Currie, The Materials of Law
Study, Part Three, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1955); Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective, 54 VA. L. REV. 689 (1968).
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opments as particularly significant: 2
3
(a) the interest in international law in the 1950's and 1960's;
4
(b) the revival of an interest in the social sciences in the 1960's;
(c) the insistence on "relevance" in the curriculum in the early 1970's,
as reflected in courses such as poverty law and consumer protection; 5
(d) the Carrington Report of 1971, with its acceptance of the feasibility
of a two-year curriculum and a clear demarcation between general and
6
advanced law studies;
(e) responses to the articulated concern for deteriorating professional
7
ethics, including various proposals for instruction in ethics;
(f) the clinical education movement of the 1970's and 1980's, with its
proposals for broadened skills training and reduced reliance on appellate
case review as the basic methodology of legal education;3 and,
(g) the law and economics movement of the 1970's and 1980's, which
prompted both a reorientation of some traditional courses and the implementation of new advanced offerings. 9
2. See Schwartz, Economics in Legal Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDuc. 365 (1983); see also
Stevens, American Legal Scholarship: StructuralConstraintsand Intellectual Conceptualism, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 442, 446 (1983).

3. See, e.g., Bishop, InternationalLaw and the American Lawyer, MICH. STATE B.J., May
1949, at 42-43; Carlston, The Teaching oflternationalLaw in Law Schools, 48 COLUM. L. REV.
516, 527-33 (1948); Franklin, Needed More and Better Courses in InternationalLaw, 4 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 326, 326 (1952); Sohn, The PresentImportance of Teaching InternationalLaw and Organization, 7 J. LEGAL EDUC. 199, 202 (1954); Vanderbilt, The Responsibilities of Our Law Schools to the
Public and the Profession, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 207, 209 (1950).
4. See, e.g., J. HALL, COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 111 (1963) (proposing new
sociolegal "humanistic" science premised on reorientation of law and the social sciences to a common subject matter); Dror, Prolegomenon to a Social Study of Law, 13 J. LEGAL EDUC. 131, 156
(1960) ("[I]t seems necessary ... to recognize the social study of law as a separate subject which
ought to be included in the curriculum of law schools and social science departments.").
5. See, eg., Pattison, Atavism, Relevancy, and the Hermit The Law School Today, 29 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 62 (1977); Richardson, Does Anyone Carefor More Hemlock?, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC.
427, 432-34 (1973); Taylor, Wealth, Poverty and Social Change: A Suggestionfor a Balanced Curriculum, 22 J. LEGAL EDUC. 227 (1969); see also Mohr & Rodgers, Legal Education: Some Student
Reflections, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 403 (1973).
6. THE CARRINGTON REPORT (1971), reprintedin H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 95-328 (1972).
7. See, e.g., Bresnahan, "Ethics" and the Study and Practiceof Law: The Problem of Being
Professionalin a Fuller Sense, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 189 (1976); Watson, The Watergate Lawyer Syndrome: An EducationalDeficiency Disease, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441 (1974).
8. See, e.g., Barnhizer, Clinical Education at the Crossroads: The Need for Direction, 1977
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1025, 1028; Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis, 26 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 162 (1974); Leleiko, ClinicalEducation, EmpiricalStudy, andLegalScholarship, 30 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 149, 165 (1979).
9. See, e.g., Gellhorn & Robinson, The Role of Economic Analysis in Legal Education, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUc. 247 (1983); Lovett, Economic Analysis andIts Role in Legal Education, 26 J. LEGAL
EDUc. 385 (1974); cf. Scott, Answers Are More Needed Than Perspectives 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 285
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Of this list, two developments that have had the most discernible
impact on current curriculum reform are the latter two, the embrace of
clinical education and instruction in law and economics. As will be seen,
an expanded role for each is included in the agenda of current proposals
for reform. Other of the proposals left a much less enduring impression.
The concept of a two-year curriculum is seldom discussed, even though
the third year of law school continues to search for a meaning and identity.10 The fervor of relevance has cooled, reflecting to no small degree
the realities of a limited job market that is perceived as rewarding
traditionalism. I

What did we learn from these earlier efforts at reform? A great deal,
it turns out. The responses to the previous new curriculum ideas have
confirmed an enduring characteristic of the traditional curriculum-its
flexibility. Although some proponents of new approaches enjoy flagellating the traditional curriculum for its rigidity, there are several important
respects in which such criticism is quite misplaced. Indeed, although
many of the course labels have stayed the same, or at least sound familiar, the curricula at many schools have experienced considerable broadening. Faculties have not wanted for ingenuity in switching the contents
of the old vessels.
There are two responses in particular that illustrate the malleability
of the traditional curriculum. One of these involves changes in the subject matter of courses that bear very traditional labels. The other involves the phenomenon of the marginal accommodation-the embracing
of reform ideas by the relatively low-cost device of adding courses at the
margin of the curriculum.
Commentators occasionally decry the fact that law schools by and
large continue to offer a first-year curriculum that has changed little in
the last fifty years. 12 In fact, leaving aside occasional experiments by
(1983) (acknowledging the development of an economic "perspective" in legal education, but questioning its efficacy).

10, See Dunne, The Third Year Blahs: ProfessorFrankfurterAfter Fifty Years, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1237 (1981); Stolz, The Two-Year Law Schook The Day the Music Died, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC.

37 (1973),
11. Elsewhere in this symposium, Abbie Thorner documents the major shift that has occurred
in the market for young lawyers. Dr. Thorner observes that the idealism of law students in the

1970's coincided with a job market in which opportunities were plentiful. In more recent times,
economic forces have required that students, and law schools, be more careerist in their orientation.
See Thomer, LegalEducation in the Recruitment Marketplace: Decades of Change, 1987 DUKE L.J.
276.
12. See, e.g., Horwitz, Are Law Schools Fifty Years Out ofDate?, 54 UMKC L. REv. 385, 386

(1986) ("The first year curriculum still seems to convey the idea that the common law is the norm[,]
... perpetuat[ing] the idea that regulations and statutes are abnormal, usually and in fact slightly
suspect.").
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venturesome schools, the labels in the first year do appear to be the same:
torts, contracts, property, procedure, and criminal law. But a closer look
at first-year instruction reveals a much different picture. The basic
courses have revealed a capacity to admit of considerable flexibility, not
only in substance, but also in methodology.
The course in contracts provides an example. The course acquired a
substantial legislative perspective with the incorporation of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Whether explicitly recognized or not, the skills imparted in contracts courses built around the UCC can be quite different
13
from those commonly attibuted to Langdellian versions of the offering.
However, the same course label-contracts-can also accommodate a
challenging and useful introduction to law and economics. 1 4 At the
heart of contracts is the exchange. Once there are exchanges, markets
cannot be far behind. Contracts rules provide an excellent vehicle for an
introductory explanation of the economic effects of legal rules.
In addition, most of the traditional first-year courses are adaptable
to new methodologies. As a number of teachers and casebook writers
have found, the grasp of the appellate case method can be loosened with
relative ease. The subject of contracts, for example, rather steadily admits of the introduction of techniques in problem solving and, for the
more venturesome, a first look at clinical approaches. 15 By the same token, those who seek to introduce more legal theory into the curriculum
will find the basic subjects to be very accommodating. Again using the
subject of contracts as the focus, good examples can be found of course
materials in which appellate cases have been partially replaced by textual
presentations on the nature of contracts and the contracting process. 16
Finally, contracts is quite accommodating to a legal history perspective.17 The influence of early mercantilism, the later industrial revolu13. See Friedman, ContractLaw and ContractResearch (Part1), 20 J. LEGAL EDuC. 452, 45657, 459-60 (1968); Speidel, ContractLaw: Some Reflections Upon Commercial Context and the Judicial Process, 20 J. LEGAL EDUC. 474 (1968).
14. See, e.g., A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (1979); R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 79-123 (3d ed. 1986); Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts,7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978); Rea, Efficiency Implicationsof Penalties and Liquidated Damages, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 147 (1984); Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific
Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of ContractRemedies, 83 MICH. L. REv. 341, 342 (1984).
15. See, eg., D. VERNON, CONTRACTS: THEORY & PRACTICE (1980).
16. See, eg., R. SUMMERS & R. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE (1987).

17. Several commentators have argued that the historical context in which contract rules are
devised affects the policy choices implicit in them. See, eg., Horowitz, The HistoricalFoundationsof
Modern ContractLaw, 87 HARV. L. REv. 917 (1974); Simpson, Quackery and ContractLaw: The
Case of the Carbolic Smoke Ball, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 345 (1985).
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tion, and more modem technological innovation can all be found in
contract cases and related legal developments.
Again, the extent of curriculum reform in the past fifteen years has
probably been understated, perhaps by a significant degree. Although
the labels continue more or less intact, the process of defining the content
of courses has been much more dynamic. In many respects, this particular accommodation of form and substance is quite comfortable. The
preservation of standard labels appeals to the conservative orientation of
the law and probably buys peace with the most skeptical segments of the
bar. The capacity for significant substantive change, on the other hand,
satisfies urges for creativity and reexamination that are found among the
best law teachers and the most thoughtful practitioners."'
As an explanation of the recent history of changes in law school
curricula, another phenomenon, the matter of accommodating new ideas
at the margin, commands particular importance. How did law schools
respond to the earlier demands for relevancy, for clinical instruction and
the like? Although responses varied, a common reaction was to leave the
traditional curriculum intact and to accommodate the demands for
change by adding courses at the margin.
Staffing such courses often represented a significant potential cost,
but careful planning ensured that the risk of excessive financial commitment was manageable. The individuals who taught the speeialized
courses often taught in the basic curriculum. Indeed, the internal reward
system of the institution usually ensured that substantial contact with the
core curriculum was a desired result. 19
Clinical education and, to a somewhat lesser extent, law and economics have been important beneficiaries of the extreme flexibility that is
found in the law school curriculum. As an advanced offering, for exam18. It should be apparent that issues of curriculum cannot be treated as wholly separate from
those of legal scholarship. Law is unlike many disciplines in that faculty members are expected both
to engage in sophisticated scholarship and to provide instruction at the most basic level. As long as
that strong linkage continues, it is inevitable that new intellectual developments will more quickly
find expression in the curriculum. See Symposium, American Legal Scholarship: Directions and
Dilemmas, 33 J. LEGAL EDuc. 403 (1983); Symposium, Legal Scholarship: Its Nature and Purposes, 90 YALE L.J. 955 (1981).
19. Two aspects of the value system of law faculties draw people to the core curriculum. Firstyear courses and some basic upper level offerings are usually perceived as being more lively because
of heightened student interest. See, ag., H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL
EDUCATION 31 (1972); Scholl, Teaching Methodsfor Professorsof First Year Law Students; Helping
to Develop Study Skills and a Discussion of the Value of the Not for Credit Midterm, 30 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 492 (1980). In addition, courses that either are required-as is true of first-year courses-or
draw large enrollments are often seen as relatively more valuable to the institution. In the eyes of
some, the professor who teaches such a course partakes of that value.
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pie, a rigorous clinical experience carries a strong justification. 20 It introduces new skills and broadens the student's educational experience. 21
From the perspective of a faculty member whose teaching is going to be
unaffected, there may be few curricular reasons for resisting proposals for
modest clinical offerings. Although problems of accommodation were
encountered in the initial period of clinical undertakings, there were most
commonly characterized as involving an "appointments" as opposed to a
"curriculum" issue. 22
How did the upper level law school curriculum become so accommodating? Of course a variety of factors come into play. But consist-

ently underestimated is the importance of the movement in the 1950's
away from extensive mandatory course requirements in the upper level
curriculum. 23 Although the debate at the time seems to have focused on
a different question-whether young lawyers would leave law school adequately trained 24-the acceptance of an all-elective second- and thirdyear curriculum encouraged creativity and flexibility in advanced offer20. See Report and Recommendations of the Task Forceon Lawyer Competency: The Role of
the Law Schools, 1979 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO B. 15-16, 24 (the "Cramton
Report") (recommending increased coursework in the fundamental skills of lawyering and finding
that "instruction focusing on lawyer tasks in a simulated or real client clinical setting can provide a
powerful method for analytical training" as well as prepare students for real world experience); see
also Meltsner & Schrag, Reportfrom a CLEPR Colony, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 581 (1976) (describing
development and value of clinical program at Columbia University); Meltsner & Schrag, Scenesfrom
a Clinic, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1978) (detailing establishment of legal services office at Columbia
University).
21. A common complaint about the traditional curriculum is that it is "seriously redundant,"
persistently focusing on case reading and doctrinal analysis of "very small and rapidly outdated
portion[s] of substantive law," instead of providing students through clinical methods of teaching a
"broader range of legal analytical methods and skills, which would enable the students more effectively to acquire, understand, and use the substantive law, as they needed it, after they got out of law
school." Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st-Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC.
612, 618 (1984).
22. See, ag., AALS-ABA COMM. ON GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION,
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 112-20 (1980). The Committee recognized the reluctance of law
schools to commit tenure-track slots to "a field which is still young, comparatively underdeveloped,
and experimental," but concluded that "the importance of clinical legal studies to the law school
curriculum requires the application of tenure status to individuals principally teaching in the legal
studies curriculum." Id
Dean Paul D. Carrington has opposed tenure for clinicians, observing that "a university law
school that has a very strong commitment to the scholarly enterprise should not tenure a person who
does not share that commitment," while Professor Dean H. Rivkin has favored such tenure since
"[clinicians] engage in activities virtually indistinguishable from many of their colleagues." Versus:
Pro and Con-FacultyStatusfor Clinical Teaching?, SYLLABUS, Mar. 1982, at 1, 9.
23. See Prosser, The Ten Year Curriculum, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 149, 150 (1953); see also Macdonald, Curriculum Development in the 1980s: A Perspective, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 569, 570-73
(1982).
24. See Meyers, CurricularReform: Budgetary Restraints and Responsibility to the Profession,
27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 2 (1975).
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ings. The review of proposals for new offerings could be less exacting
because there was less at stake. The question was no longer "is this subject matter something that every good lawyer should know?" Instead,
the upper level curriculum came to be seen as something of a marketplace of ideas in which the main concern for any particular entry was
whether it would enhance the future lawyer's understanding of his or her
work. 25 Because there is little in the social order that the law does not
affect, the movement away from pure utilitarianism and toward a more
general standard of intellectual pertinency greatly expanded the embrace
of the law school curriculum.
B. Recent Proposalsfor Reform.
The last few years have seen a rather dramatic increase in the
number of proposals for curriculum reform and the willingness of proponents to advocate basic redirections in legal education. Although many
proposed changes are anything but marginal, these suggestions occur
against the background of the earlier broadening of perspectives on the
nature of "appropriate" legal training. Clearly there is no one prevailing
26
view of what it means to be a well-trained lawyer.
Several different themes appear in recent proposals. There are a
number of suggestions for a more thorough integration of the social sciences. 27 Others urge that greater attention be given to legal theory, in25. This broadened view of the curriculum has not been without its costs, including a loss of
coherency. See infra text accompanying notes 87-89; see also Cramton, The Current State of the
Law Curriculum, 32 3. LEGAL EDUC. 321, 327-28 (1982) ("[The abandonment of collective responsibility by the law faculties for the curriculum as a whole... and deference to individual faculty
autonomy [have created] a law curriculum with no perceptible structure, sequence or organization."); Klare, The Law-School Curriculum in the 1980.v Whats Left?, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 336,
337-38 (1982) (noting that students are disabled intellectually in part by "an upper-level experience
loosely structured to the point of disintegration, consisting of a melange or hodge-podge of public
and private law courses"); Michelman, T7he Partsand thc Whole" Non-Euclidean CircularGeometry,
32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 352, 354 (1982) ("(ilt is next to impossible not to notice what looks like plain
deficiencies of coordination in the total array-or disarray-of offerings.").
26. This observation about the lack of unanimity on the definition of an appropriate curriculum
may have one dissenter. Geoffrey Hazard feels that "there would be pretty broad consensus" within
the legal academic community and within the legal profession on a definition of an ideal law school
curriculum that included: (1) indoctrination in law; (2) training in basic practice skills and techniques; (3) education in relevant nonlegal disciplines; and (4) education in depth in some specific
legal problem. See Hazard, Curriculum Structure and Faculty Structure, 35 J. LEGAL EDUc. 326,
327-28 (1985). The contrary view is based on the extreme breadth in the array of recent proposals
for curriculum reform.
27. See, e.g., Priest, Social Science Theory and LegalEducation: The Law School as University,
33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437 (1983); Schwartz, The Future ofEconomics in Legal Education: The Prospects for a New Model Curriculum, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 314 (1983); Zimring, Where Do the New
Scholars Learn New Scholarship?, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 453 (1983).
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cluding theories of law, rights, and authority. 2 8 Proposals for a
significant expansion of clinical education can be found, including one
that would reorient the basic introductory curriculum around clinical
methods. 29 Under other proposals, the study of "values," both political
and cultural, would assume a more explicit role.Y' In addition, there are

various specific skills and subject areas that are suggested for inclusion in
the modem curriculum. Those that have received the most attention re-

cently include statistics, 31 alternative dispute resolution, 32 and techniques
3
in written and oral communication. '
The array of recent proposals is sufficiently varied to elude most
efforts at achieving a comprehensive classification scheme. There are,
though, some discernible themes. For example, there is one issue that
provides a basis for preliminary differentiation. In general terms, the issue is: Will a particular reform result in a change in the basic structure
of legal education, or is it one that can be accommodated as a supplement

to the existing core? Proposals for adding particular courses often raise
interesting questions of "how to" and "why." But typically these pro34
posals represent little challenge to the existing curriculum structure.

Like the "relevance courses" of the 1970's, they can be added to the advanced curriculum with limited intrusion and, if properly planned, lim28. See, eg., Cramton, supra note 25, at 330-32 (suggesting that "the law curriculum is neither
sufficiently theoretical nor sufficiently practical"); Kare, supra note 25, at 343 ("Emphasis on theoretical learning in the law-school curriculum would serve to bring a sense of totality and coherence
to students' understanding of the common-law experience.").
29. See Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 617-18.
30. See, eg., Halpern, On the Politicsand Pathology of Legal Education, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC.
383, 387 (1982) ("[TIhe emphasis on case law effectively precludes consideration of fundamental
questions about law.'); Kershen, Humanitics and the First-Year Curriculum in Law School, 34
OKLA. L. REv. 790, 792-93 (1981) (proposing that "the entire first year of law school be devoted to
the study of law as a humanistic discipline" so the student "can then view law school as part of the
unending humanistic quest for a fuller and deeper understanding of ourselves, society and history");
Lesnick, Legal Education's Concern with Justice A Conversation with a Critic, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC.
414, 420 (1985) ("TIhe presence in the law schools of tears, prayers, anger, despair, division, and
feelings of oppression, while perhaps not symptoms of success in constructing a quality legal education, are symptoms of struggle over exactly the subjeets that it is essential to struggle over.'.
3 1. See Kaye, Thinking Like a Statistician: The Report of the American StatisticalAssociation
Committee on Training in Statistics in Selected Professions, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 97, 100-02 (1984)
(summarizing recommendations for educating law students in statistics).
32. See Sander, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Law School Curriculum: Opportunities
and Obstacles, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229, 236 (1984); see also Developments in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 26 (1987).
33. See Vernon, Educationfor Proficiency: The Continuum, 33 J. LEGAL EDuc. 559, 563-65
(1983).
34. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 31, at 100-02 (noting various nonobtrusive ways to meet the
recommended two-semester-hours equivalent of a basic course in applied probability and statistics).
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ited cost.3 5
Other proposals, however, intend that a wholly new order be imposed on legal education. In their most extreme forms, the proposals call
for an abandonment of traditional course divisions and the establishment
of a new array of offerings structured either around aspects of the legal
37
process (as opposed to subject matter) 36 or around a methodology.
Many of the structural proposals also assume the obsolescence of tradi38
tional faculty members, or at least an obsolescence of their skills.
Other versions are milder, incorporating suggestions for reordering
course topics, but with an emphasis on skills more readily adaptable by
most existing faculty members.
Proposals for expanding -the role of the social sciences illustrate the
varying degrees of change that are being urged. Most good law schools
have added faculty who are trained inone of the social sciences and who
teach in the basic curriculum.3 9 Indeed, some of the most significant
recent writing about law and the legal system has come from this group.
One secondary contribution of this scholarship is to suggest the respects
in which traditional lawmaking and law materials operate oblivious to
the substantial contribution of other disciplines in explaining our social
order. 40
Most people who have thought about the law school curriculum
would agree with the general notion that more needs to be done to accommodate the learning of the social sciences. How the accommodation
is to be made is another matter, however. A variety of proposals have
been put forth. For example, there has been a specific proposal to reorient the entire first-year curriculum around a law and economics perspective, with additional offerings that would explain, respectively, empirical
41
methodology and the influence of culture on law.
35. See Hiner, Pedrick & Reppy, Should PermanentFaculty Teach First-Year Legal Writing?
A Debate, 32 J.LEGAL EDuc. 413 (1982).
36. See Schwartz, supra note 27, at 315-16.
37. See Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 616-17.
38. See Auerbach, Legal Education and Some of its
Discontents, 34 J.LEGAL EDuc. 43, 71-72
(1984).
39. See Zimring, supra note 27, at 453 n.4 (calling for more training in empirical research for
aspiring law professors and criticizing law schools for taking the "Noah's Ark" approach: "Get two
but no more than two of the best of everything.").
40. See Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practiceand Training, 33 J.LEGAL EDUC.570, 581-82
(1983) (warning that law schools "ignore the social sciences at [theirl peril," for social science techniques are growing increasingly refined and probably would help improve the legal system); Gee &
Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REV. 695,
877 (1977) ("[R]eality dictates that there be an increasing interest in interdisciplinary programming
as a closer nexus between law and other allied disciplines naturally develops.").
41. See Schwartz, supra note 27, at 315-16.
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Perhaps the most venturesome proposal comes, presumably with a
bit of hyperbole, from George Priest. 42 He suggests that the law school
should become a mini-university within the university and be structured
around a number of small graduate divisions, each representing one of
the social sciences: "The law school curriculum will come to consist of
graduate courses in applied economics, social theory, and political science."' 43 Both teaching and learning will be increasingly narrow.
Others see the need for greater integration of the social science perspective but propose an accommodation on much milder terms. Bob
Summers, for example, advocates the continuation of present advanced
offerings in the social sciences and the addition of a required first-year
course deftly entitled "Fact, Social Science, and Law." 44 Proponents of
other forms of accommodation can be found, including those who
suggest that students be immersed in applications of empirical
45
methodology.
Many proposals assume that the nature of law school supported research will be expanded to include the research endeavors of the faculty
members trained in the social sciences. 4 6 The law school presumably will
be prepared to provide or arrange for the funding of empirical research, a
venture that has not previously been common in the law school's support
endeavors and which surely has significant budgetary implications.
As can be seen, the important curriculum question to be asked is not
simply whether there should be a greater accommodation of social sciences in the law school curriculum. The more difficult issue goes to how
thorough and complete should be the integration. The array of choices
invites a rigorous inquiry into this issue.
Proposals for an increased role for clinical education present a similar issue. Many begin as suggestions for a radical reorienting of the law
school curriculum with significant resources shifted to clinical offerings
and away from traditional instruction, which is frequently perceived as

42. See Priest, supra note 27.
43. Id. at 440-41.
44. See Summers, The Future of Economics in Legal Education: Limits and Constraints,33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 337, 353 (1983).
45. See Hazard, supra note 26, at 330.
46. See Bok, supra note 40, at 581-82 ("Ifthe necessary research is to go forward, legal scholars
must organize it and participate in it, albeit with the aid of interested colleagues from other disciplines."); Hazard, supra note 26, at 330 (implementation of Hazard's ideal curriculum would "require that the law school itself have a continuously ongoing program of social science research, or
that it be intimately connected with other departments that were so engaged and into which law
students could be introduced as collaborators").
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redundant and repetitive in terms of skills that are conveyed. 47 Although
education in the clinical setting is recognized as much more expensive
than traditional offerings, it is seen as a more certain route for ensuring
that prospective lawyers develop perspectives and skills that will continue to have value as their practice endeavors mature. But again, a decisionmaker can modulate the degree of its agreement with the premise of
such a curriculum change. Although there are proponents for the accommodation of clinical techniques in the basic structure of the law
school curriculum, a law school (or the decisionmaker directing its fu48
ture) may choose reforms of a much more marginal nature.
The two examples given above are subject matter specific. Not all
proponents of basic curriculum reform would agree about the desirability
of building the curriculum around a single topical theme. Some proposals can be seen as a reaction to the recent tendency toward the marginal
accommodation of new courses and the uncritical continuation of traditional offerings. In the view of some commentators, the end product of
such a process is a loss of coherency.
Roger Cramton has perhaps done the most to call attention to the
disarray in the present curriculum and to propose a comprehensive alternative. 49 He calls for a curriculum that is both more theoretical and
more practical. More attention would be devoted to exploring the theoretical foundations of basic legal relationships. In addition, the perceived
narrowness and redundancy of the skills conveyed in traditional courses
would be cured by a greater emphasis on skills thought to be more useful
in a professional setting.
An important ingredient in Professor Cramton's system is a more
authoritative role for the law school administration.50 While the present
47. See Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 615-18; see also Holton, Outline for an IntegratedLaw
Curriculum, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 195 (1972) (outlining a four-year law school curriculum with the
fourth year devoted to a "clinical expression of learning acquired in the first three years").

48. Indeed, commentators recognize that clinical courses are popular because they can be
added to the law school curriculum without major restructuring. As Herbert Packer and Thomas
Ehlrich note, "clinical education lends itself to being a separateactivity; it is by nature removed from
the law school and up to the present has been essentially extra-curricular. Thus small clinical programs can be added 'on the side' to the curriculum, necessitating no fundamental changes in the life
of the law school nor, more significantly, in the lives of most of the faculty." H. PACKER & T.
EHRLICH, supra note 19, at 37-38. E. Gordon Gee and Donald W. Jackson note that tension only
arises between academicians and clinicians when there is "an attempt to integrate clinical legal education into the curriculum with all of the appropriate trappings." Gee & Jackson, supra note 40, at

877.
49. See Cramton, supra note 25, at 327-29; Cramton, Lawyer Competence and the Law Schools,
4 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1 (1981).

50. See Cramton, supra note 25, at 334-35. One facet of this more authoritarian role is stated
rather unmistakenly in Professor Cramton's appraisal of the extent to which the existing "student
culture" of law school inhibits curriculum change:
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law school curriculum embraces a central theme of faculty autonomy
and student discretion in choosing upper level courses, the Cramton proposals assume an emphasis on coordination, sequencing, and predetermined course content that will necessitate a significant increase in
institutional regulation.5 1

II. CURRICULUM REFORM IN CONTEXT
Judging from the delightful array of recent writings on curriculum
reform in the Journalof LegalEducation, it is much more fashionable to
talk about the nature and scope of potential reforms than to address the
more pragmatic concerns that will determine whether they are adopted.
Indeed, it is not uncommon for a proposal to be put forth without comment on its costs or its effects on existing resources, especially existing
faculty resources. But the "process" of curriculum reform will have a
significant impact on the configuration of any reforms ultimately accepted. Thus, while the current reform agenda is quite full, many of the
proposals lose their luster when they confront the constraints that define
the present potential of legal education.
We now turn our attention to the three elements that are likely to be
most influential in the present debate on reform. These are the role of
faculty autonomy, the likely continuation of the preference for flexibility,
and the consideration of costs.
A.

Faculty Autonomy.

Faculty members not involved in curriculum reform might be a bit
surprised at what is said about them by those who are. On those relatively rare occasions when a question is raised as to why a particular set
of reforms is not adopted, a common response is that the faculty controls
the curriculum and the faculty resists change. The faculty as a curriculum setting body is seen as being rather conservative, protective of their
existing prerogatives and reluctant to innovate.5 2 This rather uncompli[T]he fact that many students view law school as an obstacle course on the way to an initial
law job creates practical and political problems for curriculum change. But these difficulties can be surmounted with patience, seduction, and, if necessary, brute force.
Id at 333.
51. Other commentators have perceived a "shapelessness" in the modern curriculum. See eg.,
Michelman, supra note 25, at 355-56 ("[Q]uestions of curriculum ... are finally the responsibility of
the faculty as a whole to try to deal with."); Sandalow, The Moral Responsibility of Law Schools, 34

J. LEGAL EDUC. 163, 164 (1984) (commenting that the state of the curriculum is "symptomatic of
...the seeming inability of law schools to address fundamental issues concerning the goals of legal
education" and that recent curricular innovations "suggest only that law schools are prepared to
accept, willy-nilly, whatever new ideas may be advanced about the educational needs of students").
52. Commentators have offered various explanations for law faculty intransigence. Roger
Cramton observes that "[s]ince the national law schools are also sprinkled with teachers who are

330
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mentary view of the faculty's role is the one most frequently given for
why broad scale reforms have not been forthcoming..
It is true that law faculty members presently enjoy a great deal of
autonomy. It is also true that any intrusion into present prerogatives is
likely to encounter resistance. By the same token, however, it is far from
clear that faculties are accurately characterized as too resistant to inno-

vation.53 Moreover, there may be strong reasons of educational policy to
preserve a wide berth for faculty prerogative. The climate for creativity
that is thus created may be more valuable than a more tightly drawn
curriculum structure.
The accuracy of the characterization of the faculty as unsympathetic
and obstructionist can be questioned. Under one view, the recent historical record is quite to the contrary. Recent experience with new courses
reflects something approaching phenomenal growth in terms of the
methodology and subject matter that now yields law school credit. 54 Indeed, many of the current topics vying for increased attention in the curriculum-law and economics, other social sciences and their
methodologies, clinical education-have met with initial faculty acceptance.5 5 The same is true of other items on our list of earlier reforms.
threatened by anything new, disdainful of the practice of law, and inclined to be intolerant of any
research other than the manipulation of doctrine or abstract theory, progress has been slow." Cramton, supra note 25, at 326. He suggests that curricular innovation is slow because responsibility for
change rests largely on the faculty of the national law school who "have the least incentive to develop new and better ways of teaching lawyer skills since their graduates, unlike those of the local
schools, generally receive a good on-the-job apprenticeship in some lawyering skills in the major law
firms." d.
Geoffrey Hazard blames the nature of law school faculty selection for the lack of innovation in
the law school curriculum. He finds "that faculty select faculty, that faculty individually have tenure and collectively have constitutional authority over the curriculum, and that in these respects all
members of the faculty are equal.... Thus, with law school faculty being equal, law school courses
are all equal, and the curriculum does not change." Hazard, supra note 26, at 332.
Warren Schwartz finds an economic explanation for faculty intransigence:
[L]aw professors have the opportunity to increase their nonmonetary income by choosing a
curriculum they prefer. They can exercise this power either by lowering their personal
costs or by increasing their benefits. They can reduce their costs by resisting curricular
change which would make more costly the performance of their duties. Thus a curriculum
that involves systematic incorporation of economics or other disciplines may be rejected in
favor of one which permits continued utilization of existing human capital. In general,
then, faculties will have an incentive to resist changes which increase the costs of performing their teaching responsibilities.
Schwartz, supra note 27, at 334.
53. As Warren Schwartz recognizes, good faculty attach a high value to study and learning.
Schwartz, supra note 27, at 334. These qualities will include a preference for the innovative and the
insightful, an orientation that should extend to issues affecting the curriculum.
54. The expansion of the modern law school curriculum into previously unexplored areas can
ba seen as the countervailing virtue to the complaints that have been raised about incoherency. See
supra note 51 and accompanying text.
55. See, ag., Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 9, at 247; Schwartz, supra note 27, at 334.

V'ol. 1987:317]

LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM

This behavior hardly bespeaks unthinking resistance to innovation.
There is another much different reason for doubting the sufficiency
of explaining the failure of curriculum reform proposals by degrading the

faculty's role. Faculty autonomy, even if it conforms to the low characterization given it by its critics, must surely be a two-edged concept.
While a faculty member-under the critic's view-will not readily give
up his or her prerogatives, by the same token the individual will be relatively unconcerned by what goes on in other bailiwicks. 56 The tolerance
of extreme eclecticism in the advanced curriculum seems to confirm this.
An implication of this analysis is that one would expect relatively

little resistance to competing models of instruction within a single
faculty. Again, there is a good deal of evidence to confirm this high level
of tolerance. In some cases, the competing model is explicitly different,
as in the case of the alternative Stanford curriculum. 5 7 In others, it is as
simple as the acceptance of courses that vary widely in content but bear

the common label of "torts" or "property" or the like. The transformation of the subject of "contracts" into an offering of highly variable con-

tent was possible precisely because the collective faculty does not exercise
58
a tight hand in curriculum matters.
A final point is of more general significance and that is that a preference for faculty autonomy over tight curricular control may be quite defensible. Such autonomy has its virtues and these may well be deemed by
neutral parties to be of a higher order than the favorite reform proposals
of a few. At a minimum, the question of reform versus continued autonomy should be seen as a lively one.
56. Roger Cramton, who is otherwise rather critical of the faculty's role in curriculum planning, accepts the basic point that faculties have been more indifferent than possessive. He has observed that "the Lone Ranger theory of legal education, almost universally observed in the United
States, involves an implicit compact (some would call it a conspiracy) among faculty members; 'you
do your thing in your course as long as I am permitted to do my thing in mine.'" Cramton, supra
note 25, at 327-28. This agreement leads to widespread ignorance among faculty members about
their school's curriculum. "In terms of content, no one knows whether the law of standing, for
example, has been omitted entirely or taught once, twice, three times, or even more. In terms of
method, [faculty members] know little about how [their] colleagues teach and what the effect of their
efforts is on students as a whole." Id at 327.
57. The Stanford experiment, called Curriculum B, is offered to a small group of students as an
alternative to the standard first-year curriculum. Curriculum B involves more fully intergrated versions of the traditional first-year offerings, plus shorter courses providing perspectives from economics, history, and the social sciences. See Stan. Law., Winter/Spring 1979-80, at 46, col. 1.
Harvard Law School has attempted a more limited experiment in its first-year curriculum. Instructors in a group of basic first-year courses hold weekly multidisciplinary classes and periodic
bridge sessions to emphasize the connections between their subjects. See Harv. L. Rec., Oct. 5, 1984,
at 7, col. 1; Harv. L. Rec., Mar. 2, 1984, at 3, col. 1.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
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Most of the models for pervasive curriculum reform assume, typically without elaboration, that there will be more thorough, more detailed administrative control of faculty work effort than at present.
Indeed, a doubtful feature of some proposals is their implicit assumption
of an exquisite fine-tuning of the content and sequencing of courses. 59
Again, though, virtually no attention is given to the trade-offs of such
regimentation.
A very likely consequence of such control, however, is a significant
loss in creativity and innovation. In a curriculum that is less centrally
directed, considerable freedom exists to test new approaches and seek
new insights into a subject area. 6° It is understandable that some faculty
members view this wide range of prerogatives as a virtue worth
preserving.
An impressive feature of the law and economics movement, for example, is the extent to which it was a spontaneous adaptation of new
ideas. Most faculties have in their midst individuals with rather traditional credentials who first examined, then tested, and then adopted a
version of the law and economics perspective. 6 1 Not infrequently, this
adaptation occurred under the guise of a course load in which the basic
labels remained unaltered. It is quite imaginable that in a different era
where course content was more tightly controlled, the embrace of economic analysis would have been much delayed.
Stated another way, most proposals for a fundamentally restructured curriculum fail to give us a reassurance that the better curriculum
idea of the 1980's will not be the horse collar of the twenty-first century.
A lack of fervor for increasing the bureaucracy of legal education should
not necessarily be seen as intransigence.
B.

The Adaptability of the Present Curriculum.

An attraction of the present law school curriculum is its capacity for
absorbing new ideas. Complaints that the curriculum is excessively rigid
59. For those who are concerned about a perceived lack of coherency in the modern curriculum, there would appear to be no choice but to impose more exacting regulation. See Cramton,
supra note 25, at 327-28. Even more venturesome is the implicit assumption underlying the calls for
more instruction in values and political premises. See, eg., Halpern, supra note 30, at 391-94. Such
instruction can occur only if there is first an agreement as to the values to be conveyed. There is
little reason to believe that a consensus on this point will emerge. In the absence of consensus, some
significant authoritarian intrusion leading to the selection of preferred values would be necessary.
60. For a generally approving view of the capacity of law schools to generate and enhance new
ideas, see Hughes, The Great American Legal Scholarship Bazaar, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 424 (1983).
61. See Lovett, supra note 9, at 388-93. It is not uncommon for commentaries on legal education to include assertions that the curriculum has not changed in several decades. See, eg., Horwitz,
supra note 12, at 386. As earlier suggested, however, this perspective may understate the extent to
which substantive curriculum changes have been masked by a continuation of historical forms.
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and unchanging may simply be incorrect. As earlier discussed, traditional course offerings have proven amenable to new methodologies and
new substantive perspectives. 62 In the same vein, the traditional curriculum has shown a great capacity to accept additions at the margin.
The period from 1965 to 1985 was one of significant change in the
nation's social order. Inevitably, it was also a period of great change in
the law. Even though there are signs of strain and a few tattered edges,
the traditional curriculum allowed law schools to weather rather well the
significant cycles of the past twenty years. 63 One can imagine other curriculum approaches-for example, one that relied on two or two-and-ahalf years of required courses-that would not have endured so well.
It is quite imaginable that when faced with proposals for the curriculum that are narrower and more highly focused, law faculties will continue to prefer the malleability of the traditional model. The boldest of
the present proposals-those that would organize the law school curriculum around a single subject matter or single perspeetive-inevitably seem
to be less flexible, especially when the degree of change in the law over
the past twenty years is projected into the future. 64 It may well be that
the lessons of law and economfics will not seem as urgent in the early
twenty-first century as they do now. 65 At a minimum, it is understandable that faculties might be hesitant to cast their lot with a single, comprehensive perspective.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17.
63. The period from 1970 to 1973 may provide the best examples of the adaptability of the
curriculum. That era was rather unusual in that pointed complaints about legal education came
from students, a type of activism not witnessed on such a grand scale either before or since that time.
The students' concerns ranged from dissatisfaction with the substantive coverage of the curriculum
to complaints about the values that were being conveyed in traditional courses. Law schools used
various approaches in responding to these issues. See Johnstone, Student Discontent and Educational Reform in the Law School, 23 3. LEGAL EDUC. 255 (1970); Pattison, supra note 5, at 63-64;
Richardson, supra note 5, at 432-34. The most important point, however, is that the adaptations
came with relatively little upheaval and even less cost to the basic curriculum design.
64. The present proposals for curriculum reform include several that give plausibility to the
concern about inflexibility. George Priest's proposal for mini-graduate departments in the social
sciences excludes a number of alternatives that might later be desirable. See Priest, supra note 27, at
441. Some law and economics proposals have a similar characteristic. A singular perspective requires something of a leap of faith, especially for those who believe that a human perspective that is
more than simply economic influences how disputes arise and get resolved. See, ag., Kelman, MisunderstandingSocial Lif&" A Critique of the Core Premises of "Law and Economics," 33 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 274, 277-78 (1983); Summers, supra note 44, at 344-48.
65. Bob Summers gives a rather thorough ordering of the reasons why many find that an economic perspective provides an incomplete explanation for the nature of law. Among these reasons is
a failure to take account of human values that have no ready economic translation. See Summers,
supra note 44, at 342-52; see also Kelman, supra note 64, at 274 ("[Economic analysis of law] has
served a mystifying, obscuring, function [and has misled] lawyers and law students through its simplistic elegance not only into what strikes me as a relatively minor sin-misunderstanding law-but
a rather serious one as well-misunderstanding social life in general.").
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The element of adaptability in the curriculum also complements the
virtuous side of faculty autonomy. As noted, such autonomy can foster
great creativity and indeed it has in recent years. But for new perspectives on the nature of the law to get fullest expression, extreme rigidity in
the curriculum must be avoided. 66 Sometimes subject matter and methodological innovations occur in smaller steps. At other times, they appear as grand experiments. In each case, the impulses toward such
creativity are encouraged if there is flexibility in the curriculum structure. Again, not all of the new idcas for curriculum reform will continue
this flexibility and thus there are differing views on the value of forsaking
the existing preference for a looser structure.
C.

The Issue of Costs.

The issue of costs will play a prominent role in the debate on curriculum reform. Most faculty members are aware of the significant cost
difference between various methods of instruction. And it does not take
a great deal of thought to see that one of the most powerful forces driving
the traditional curriculum structure is its relative cost advantage. For
example, in a school with an enrollment of 600 students, the entire firstyear instructional burden can be met by the equivalent of slightly more
than six of the thirty faculty-years of teaching output that are likely to be
available. 67 Decreasing course enrollment by one-half or by threefourths consumes tremendous additional resources. 68 Despite the obviousness of this point, it typically receives no attention or only a passing
mention in discussions of reform.6 9
To some extent, this avoidance of the cost issue is understandable.
70
Faculties typically play a minor role in overall budgetary planning.
66. See Kelso & Kelso, Legal Education'sFailure: 4 BroaderHorizon or a Narrowing Window?, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 661, 682-83 (1981).
67. The law school model contrast; rather sharply with that used in most graduate programs,
where seminars, supervised research, and mentorships are the norm.
68. Some commentators have expressed doubts about the wisdom of the law schools' embrace
of large classes. Edward Cohen, for example, has observed:
The law school world has either permitted, or willingly assisted in, the sublimation or
sacrifice of sound educational goals to the inexorable forces of numbers. As long as the law
schools permit themselves to be sold as the biggest bargain a University can have, they are
doomed to archaic and reactionary educational processes.
Cohen, Toward Radical Reform of the Law School Curriculum, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 210, 211 (1972).
See also Velvel, Suggested Improvement, in Legal Education, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 194, 198 (1978).
69. Among recent proposals, one of the notable exceptions in which the issue of costs is explicitly considered is Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 617-18.
70. Monroe Freeman has provided a unique inside view of the personal and political considerations that influence the exercise of university control over law school budgets. Professor Freeman
records his reactions to a governance controversy that he encountered as dean of the Hofstra Law
School. The budgetary model that fueled the dispute was like that found at many institutions; it
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Moreover, since there is no obvious mechanism for financial accountability, limitations on the faculty's budgetary role may be understandable.
But less clear then is the wisdom, and even the plausibility of asking this
group to make major expenditure decisions. One would expect-and, I
would say, sees-a great deal of indeterminancy in curriculum debates,
often because cost issues are only an implicit point and thus only as demanding as the mind's eye chooses to make them.
This particular dysfunction in the "process" of curriculum reform
explains, in large part, the lack of direction that characterizes much of
the present discussion. In a more highly regulated world, the editors of
the Journalof Legal Education might insist that each new article on curriculum reform be accompanied by an Economic Impact Statement. In
the absence of such appraisals, the noncommital response of most faculty
readers is quite predictable.
In the abstract, it is difficult to deny the value of a student's understanding the basic techniques of social science research and their limitations. A debate focusing on that question is likely to be relatively short.
But what is involved in the effective delivery of such instruction? Is
Geoffrey Hazard correct that an important lesson of prior experience
with social science methods "seems to be that one learns social science by
doing it, that is, by actually participating in a research project, even if of
modest scale"? 71 If so, the issue of cost is of critical importance. The
lesson learned with clinical education and in the few programs for
faculty-supervised legal writing is that the cost of individualized instruction is sizable, and the resources involved will unavoidably be committed
72
to the detriment of other, usually quite worthy curricular undertakings.
In light of these costs, one would surely want to know what trade-offs are
involved in other lower cost alternatives such as instruction delivered in
73
larger groups or research supervised by persons without faculty status.
Despite the array of proposals on curriculum reform, there are few
that approach this level of differentiation. In light of this lack of specification, the generally cool reception given to calls for massive restructurassumed that the faculty would have virtually no role in setting financial priorities. See Freeman,
Holding Law Schools Hostage, LEARNING & L., Spring 1977, at 17, 18-19.
71. Hazard, supra note 26, at 330.
72. See Gee & Jackson, supra note 40, at 891-92 (discussing the debate over the relative benefits
and costs of implementing a clinical program); Vukowich, The Lack of PracticalTraining in Law
Schools: Criticisms,Causes and Programsfor Change, 23 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 140, 147-48 (1971)
("[Tihe adoption of a curriculum and pedagogical technique which emphasizes skills and practical
training would involve considerable cost, in terms of both the financial expenditure and the sacrifice
of time which would otherwise be devoted to more theoretical study.").
73. Geoffrey Hazard examines the feasibility ofmaking greater use ofnon-tenure track instructors for various teaching tasks. He finds that the present structure of law faculties offers a significant

impediment to any such innovation. Hazard, supra note 26, at 331-32.
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ing of the law school curriculum is quite sensible. Indeed, there is a
respect in which the debate on curriculum reform has yet to take itself
seriously.
There is another respect in which the issue of the cost of the proposed methodology becomes important. Presumably increased costs in
this area would be covered through higher tuition charges; no one has
suggested that there are external sources likely to find such changes in
methodology so appealing as to be prompted to provide permanent subsidization. 74 In fact, Ken Pye and John Kramer have elsewhere cogently
raised the question as to whether in the face of the present abundance of
lawyers any significant increase in state subsidization can be justified, especially at state universities. 75 A careful reading of two other papers in
this symposium, Abbie Thorner's paper on placement issues 76 and John
Kramer's examination of financial aid, 77 may suggest that we are entering an era in which enrollment patterns will show greater sensitivity to
costs than has been true in the recent past.
Thus, it will be increasingly difficult to make decisions, such as a
choice between implementing low and high cost methodologies, without
giving attention to their ultimate financial impact. Often it will be quite
unclear that either methodology can be declared inappropriate from an
educational perspective. For law schools that find themselves with enrollment trends that are cost sensitive, this uncertainty is likely to favor
continuation of the historical practice of large group instruction in the
basic subjects. 78
III.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONTINUING DEBATE
ON CURRICULUM REFORM

What are the implications for the law school curriculum in the
above assessments of the issues of autonomy, adaptability, and cost?
There are several. For one thing, it should be reasonably clear that the
74. There have been various calls over the past 15 years for lawyers and law firms to increase
their financial support of legal education. It is notable the these suggestions have gone largely unheeded. See Pye, Legal Education Past andFuture: A Summer Carol, 32 J. LEGAL EDUc. 367, 377
(1982).
75. See Pye & Kramer, Solvency and Survival After the Boom-A Different Perspective, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 462, 469-75 (1984).
76, Thorner, supra note 11, at 285 (finding that rising costs decrease the admission pool, increase competition among potential employers, and subject law school admission and placement
offices to inquiries about the marketability of their law degrees).
77. Kramer, Will Legal Education Remain Affordable, By Whom, and How?, 1987 DuKE L.J.
240 (noting that rising costs may prevent middle class students from attending because of their
inability to pay their own tuition or receive sufficient grants).
78. Cf id. at 243-44 (suggesting that rising costs will increase the incentive to attend the lowertuition public law schools, thus cutting enrollment at private schools with higher tuition).
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more singular the proposed answer to curriculum reform, the more

resistance it will encounter. Although some will dismiss this reticence by
faculty members as reflecting only timidity and intellectual curmudgeon-

ism, in truth it may have a much more principled basis. Creativity and
adaptability are elements that can properly be valued, even where the
cost is a loss of some coherency.
There is, though, another side to these same issues that holds an

important lesson for those who favor a significant restructuring. The
adaptability of the curricnlum can easily be turned to an advantage. If a
proposed change, even an extensive one, is structured to occupy only part

of the curriculum-as where it is a parallel, but alternative curriculumthe likelihood of its being adopted increases measurably. Again, there
79
are at present several strong examples of the efficacy of this approach.

This result can be achieved with minimal disruption of the ethic of
faculty autonomy. In the most successful of such structures, faculty
teach in them because they have chosen to do so. The resulting match
between perspective and commitment usually ensures a high level of
achievement and enthusiasm.
This use of the alternative curriculum approach seems particularly
well suited to proposals calling for a more discernible subject matter focus in the law school curriculum, most commonly a law and economics
or other social science perspective. The desired theme can be achieved
by commanding only a part of law school resources.8 0 In addition, the
presence of ongoing alternative approaches should encourage a level of
examination and debate that nicely serves to improve each type of offering. Avoided is the all-or-nothing choice that understandably makes a
decisionmaker nervous."' Moreover, there is an ever-present basis for

comparison that should make for more carefully drawn premises.
79. The Stanford and Harvard experiments are perhaps the most notable recent examples. See
supra note 57.
80. A joint degree program, especially one closely tied to a structured course sequence with the
same topical emphasis, offers the opportunity for further refinement of the notion of an alternative
curriculum. Among the advantages of such an offering is that it uses the existing resources of other
divisions of the university and thus potentially may limit overall costs. Cf Schneller, Interprofessional Legal Practitioners The Case of the M.D.-LLB., 27 J.LEGAL EDUC. 324, 324 (1975);
Schneller & Weiner, The M.D.-J.D. Revisited A SociologicalAnalysis of Cross-EducatedProfessionals in the Decade of the 1980s, 6 J.LEGAL MED. 337, 359 (1985).
81. Bob Summers makes this point nicely in a somewhat different context. Professor Summers
examines a variety of reasons why law and economics is likely to receive only a modest reception in
the law school curriculum. Among these is what he calls the Equal Time argument: "Itis said that
there are other games in town, e.g., other social sciences or moral philosophy or history or psychology (including social pyschology). The argument is that these subjects have their claims too ......
Summers, supra note 44, at 351. Professor Summers believes that the desire to ensure "Equal Time"
for these subjects inhibits pervasive curriculum reform. Id,
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Another implication of the present process of reform is that there
must be increased sensitivity to costs. The papers in this symposium by
Abbie Thorner and John Kramer should leave no doubt that the future
of legal education will be one iii which relative cost is an important determinant of policy choices. Proposals for reform that are significantly
more expensive will fall ou unresponsive ears, except perhaps at the most
elite schools.8 2 Although some proponents continue to offer versions of
the graduate school model 83-where all instruction oceurs with very low
student-teacher ratios-the economics of modem legal education may
well have rendered these inappropriate.
A matter that requires particular attention is the issue of delivery.
What size classes? What degree of faculty involvement? The curriculum

proposals put forth to date have done little to differentiate between what
is optimal and what is feasible in terms of instruction group size. At the
level of generality that has thus far prevailed, small group instruction is
almost always preferred. But the rather high student-teacher ratios of
the traditional model are quite engrained and it is inevitable that any
significant movement away from them will involve economic stress.84 Serious attention needs to be given to the feasibility of adopting new curriculum perspectives-especially an orientation in the social sciences-to
large group instruction. Indeed, a useful next step in the matter of curriculum reform would involve further experimentation with different
methods of delivery.8 5 In a very real sense, the victors may be those who
perfect the lower cost alternative.
The process of marginal accommodation will almost certainly continue to have a strong appeal. Indeed, the capacity of the present curriculum to absorb new courses at the margin means that some proposals for
reform raise questions that are of relatively limited import. This is true,
for example, for those proposals that involve confined topics such as statistics or alternative dispute resolution.8 6 There will inevitably be questions of appropriateness and availability of resources, but the past twenty
years carry an important lesson that many new ideas can be absorbed
without fundamental reallocations of resources.
82. Others have recognized that curriculum planning may differ greatly depending on the relative standing, and wealth, of the school involved. See Hazard, supra note 26, at 327.

83. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 27, at 441 ("Mhe increasing specialization of legal scholarship
[will lead to] a law school.., comprised of a set of miniature graduate departments in the various
disciplines.").
84. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Greenhaw, Use of Social Science Materials in Teaching Within the Standard
Generalist Law Cirriculum, 59 WASH. UL.Q. 809 (1981); McAninch, ExperientialLearning in a
TraditionalClassroom, 36 J. LEGAL EDuc. 420 (1986).
86. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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There is, though, a very important downside to the practice of adding courses at the margin-the risk that such accommodations will be
achieved at the cost of coherency in the overall curriculum.8 7 It is a fair
hypothesis that the prominence of reform proposals calling for a central
theme or focus in the curriculum are in part a response to the perceptible
lack of such a unifying structure in the courses that are presently being
offered. 88 Moreover, the tolerance of an all-elective upper level curriculum says to many observers that there can be no real confidence as to
what students are actually learning and even less assurance that the individual student's course selections follow a coherent pattern.8 9
There is a related concern that will inevitably be brought to the fore.
This is the matter of the cost of the present diversity. We are in an era in
which law schools exhibit a great tendency to want to be all things to all
people. 90 Thus, there are those who think that a good law school must
have a good clinical program, diverse interdisciplinary offerings, a strong
international program, and so on. At some point, though, the cost of this
approach can become stultifying. And such a result most likely will not
have been presented as a clear choice. Rather, because each course or
groups of courses is only added incrementally, the costs appear to be
small.
There is no simple answer to the pressure that inevitably results
from having an accommodating approach to the curriculum. Some
schools will choose-and, indeed, some have already chosen-the response of specialization. This pattern has a questionable durability, however, because it runs counter to the lesson of recent years that it is
adaptability rather than fixed structures that best respond to the nature
of change in the underlying social order.
An alternative approach is for a law school's faculty to develop a
thoughtful consensus on the mix of perspectives and methodologies that
will be taught. Such an agreement need not, and perhaps should not, be
premised on the continuation of any particular existing courses. Rather,
it should be accepted that there are almost always a variety of courses
through which a particular educational objective can be achieved.
87. See supra note 51.
88. Cramton, supra note 25, at 327 ("Except for the fact that one fundamental cognitive skillcase analysis-and one fundamental applied skill-legal research-come early in the law-school
experience, the law curriculum has no perceptible structure, sequence, or organization.");
Michelman, supra note 25, at 355 ("[There are] problems of coordination, simultaneous and sequential, among course offerings; of shapelessness in the curriculum at least beyond the first year; [and] a
lack of any clear sense of direction or progression over the three years.").
89. See Sandalow, supra note 51, at 164-66.
90. See, e.g., Meyers, supra note 24, at 2-3; Velvel, supra note 68, at 199.
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The ultimate purpose of such a consensus on goals would be to provide a measure against which expansion in the curriculum, especially expansion which is simply more of the same, could be checked. The
control that is envisaged is a very soft one, however. In particular, it is
intended to avoid the heavy regimentation that seems implicit in many of
the reform proposals put forth to date. Although such proposals achieve
a great deal in terms of introducing coherency, they do so at a rather
heavy cost to other values that have allowed law teaching and legal
scholarship finally to exhibit some vibrancy.
Readers who are being fist introduced to issues of law school curricula are likely to be surprised that there is not already a consensus on
the overall shape of the curriculum. The fact that there is not is probably
the most valid complaint of the critics of faculty autonomy. Faculties
have indeed shown a strong tendency to add courses incrementally without much thought to the overall contour of the final product. The observation being made here is simply that the economics of legal education
will not allow that to continue and thus it is time to begin thinking about
how our expansionist tendencies will be reined in. Many of the reform
proposals being put forth presently respond to the concern about incoherency. They are thus among the alternatives to be considered. There
are others, however, including the modest suggestion here that in the
regulation of the modern law school curriculum, less may be better.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The number and variety of proposals for curriculum reform sends a
needed signal that it is time to rethink the direction of legal education.
This call for inquiry should not, however, be taken as an indication that
we are at the brink of a major decision point. Some additional preliminary steps need to be taken to ensure that the debate on curriculum reform is properly focused. In particular, there is a need to reappraise the
reasons for the absence of a wholehearted embrace of the proposals put
forward to date. Among the explanations likely to be uncovered is a
preference, perhaps a strong one, for many of the values underlying the
present arrangements. The adaptability of the contemporary curriculum
and its capacity for encouraging creativity need to be recognized more
explicitly.
The next steps in the debate over curriculum reform should also
correct the presently prevailing tendency among proponents of new ideas
to avoid discussing their cost implications. A good deal turns on the
issue of "what can we afford," including such basic questions as who will
be excluded from this particular form of education and with what consequence. Now that the agenda of proposals is reasonably full, it is appro-
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priate to turn attention to matters that deal with feasibility, effectiveness,
and durability.

